AFTER a hard day at the lab, a biologist travels home on the subway. Later that evening his muscles start to ache and he notices that he is running a fever. This is no ordinary bout of flu, though. The virus behind these symptoms is a highly transmissible variant of deadly H5N1 bird flu, and already people who shared his subway car have been exposed. It could now travel quickly around the world. This is the alarming scenario that researchers are trying to prevent, now that two groups have brewed up variants of H5N1 that can spread between ferrets merely breathing the same air. "1918 flu would look like nothing if this really got loose," warns D. A. Henderson of the University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who led the fight to eradicate smallpox. "This is really serious."
In September, New Scientist reported that Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, had found that just five mutations in two genes were enough to make a lethal variant of H5N1 with the ability to transmit readily between mammals -the missing factor that has so far kept down the number of people infected with H5N1. A second team, led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, has made a subtly different virus with similar characteristics.
Debate is swirling over whether the experiments should have been carried out in the first place (see Editorial, page 3), but one thing is clear: there is little room for complacency about the risks posed by naturally occurring H5N1 viruses, which might acquire similar mutations (see "The monster in the henhouse" right).
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For daily news stories, visit newscientist.com/news However, the studies hit the headlines when it emerged that advisers to the US government had asked Science and Nature, the journals planning to publish the work, to withhold key details to avoid providing a blueprint for would-be bioterrorists.
That risk needs to be taken seriously. But prior experience suggests that accidental viral releases pose a more immediate threat.
In the wake of the 2003 outbreak of SARS, some lab staff were accidently infected by the SARS coronavirus in Singapore, Taiwan and China. In the most serious incident, the virus spread beyond a research institute in Beijing, and the mother of one of the researchers died. And in 1977, a mild strain of H1N1 flu was isolated in northern China, near the Russian border, and later spread worldwide. The virus almost certainly came from a deep-frozen lab sample, says Robert Webster of St Jude Children's Research Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, who was involved in analysing the virus.
Avoiding a repeat performance with the new H5N1 viruses is a top priority. We don't know for sure that the viruses would behave the same way in people as in ferrets, but the assumption has to be that they do. If so, any release could lead to a devastating pandemic. "We have to be concerned to keep this thing locked down," says Webster.
What "locked down" means depends on who you ask, however. The highest level of containment for biological agents, known as BSL-4, demands stringent and expensive measures to prevent accidental releases. "I can't think of another infectious agent that deserves BSL-4 more than this one," says David Relman of Stanford University in California, who sits on the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, the panel that suggested the papers should be censored.
However, demanding BSL-4 would mean that most of the world's leading flu virologists would have to scale up their labs or move elsewhere. On the Erasmus Medical Centre's website, Fouchier's team summarises the "BSL-3 plus" procedures used in its experiments.
Webster and other flu researchers argue that it is important for top Others question that assumption. Relman notes that there are likely to be multiple combinations of mutations that make wild H5N1 contagious in people, and asks whether the gains of studying these particular viruses in terms of improved surveillance for pandemic strains outweigh the risks of accidental release.
Before further research goes ahead, discussions need to take place on who should be able to work on the new viruses, and under what circumstances. Involving the nations most threatened by H5N1, such as China, will be crucial, as those who are excluded may be more likely to try and create similar viruses themselves.
With the viruses sitting in Fouchier's and Kawaoka's labs, the clock is ticking. "We can't spend years coming to a conclusion on this," says Michael Osterholm, who heads the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis. "We have got to have a plan for moving forward." n The monster in the henhouse virologists to have access to the viruses, as we need to understand the mutations that could turn H5N1 into a mass killer. "The information we can obtain is really invaluable to make public health decisions," says Daniel Perez, a flu researcher at the University of Maryland in College Park.
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